Tank warfare

Armoured warfare or tank warfare is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare. It is a major component of modern methods of war. The premise of armoured warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventional infantry-held defensive lines through use of manoeuvre of vehicles that offer protection from infantry weapons, and are able to defeat enemy supporting artillery with their own weapons included in the design, commonly a high velocity gun and machine guns.

Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the designs of these vehicles, commonly known as tanks, and on the designs of vehicles used by other supporting Arms variously known as armoured infantry and self-propelled artillery, as well as combat engineers that usually use vehicles derived from the tank or infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) designs.

The doctrine of armoured warfare was developed to break the static nature of World War I trench warfare and return to the 19th century school of thought that advocated manoeuvre warfare and "decisive battle" outcome in military strategy.

First World War and the development of tank warfare

Prior to World War I, horse-mounted cavalry performed what is now the role of tanks; manoeuvring and breaking through enemy infantry to attack army lines of communication in the rear. Strategic use of tanks was slow to develop during and immediately after World War I, partly due to technical limitations but also due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry.

Modern armoured warfare began with the need to break the tactical, operational and strategic stalemates forced on commanders on the Western Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns - known as trench warfare. Under these conditions, any sort of advance was impossibly slow and occasioned massive casualties. The development of the tank was motivated by the need to return manoeuvre to warfare.

Tanks were first developed in Britain, as a way of navigating the barbed wire and other obstacles of no-man's land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire. The manoeuvrability of the tank would at least in theory regain armies the ability to flank enemy lines. In practice, tank warfare during most of World War I was hampered by mechanical failure, limited numbers, and general underutilisation.

British Mark I tanks first went to action at the Somme, on September 15, 1916, but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare. In the Battle of Cambrai (1917) British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system, the Hindenburg Line. After the disastrous final German offensive, tanks were used at the Battle of Soissons and the Battle of Amiens, which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, and thus effectively ended the war. Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought.

The Interwar Period

During the 1920s, various British and French commanders who had been associated with the development of the tank were involved in developing the new ideas. The significant split in philosophy can be said to be French and British in schools of thought.

The French school proposed the armoured forces to be largely an Infantry supporting Arm, demanding heavily armoured tanks armed with infantry support guns, as well as 'cavalry' tanks operating en masse to break through the enemy defensive lines. Although seen as retrograding and reminiscent of WW1 tank use, it advocated a doctrine that included a desire to introduce an element of manoeuvre without expecting collapse of the enemy infantry's defence. The British school leaned more towards more mobile and lighter designs supported by equally mobile units of infantry, artillery and sappers to replace horse-mounted cavalry. These self-contained motorised detachments would depend on the tank only to provide a way to penetrate the main enemy defensive lines, and would seek to bring about defeat of the enemy by severing the lines of communication and supply as had been done during the previous century.
Both doctrines were faced with the reality during the 1920s that the armoured vehicles (as early road transport in general) were extremely unreliable, and could not be used in sustained operations.

In Britain Liddell Hart wrote extensively on tank warfare and the theories of Colonel Fuller. The British War Office sanctioned the creation of the Experimental Mechanised Force which was formed on May 1, 1927, under Colonel R. J. Collins. The units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissance tankettes and armoured cars, a battalion of 48 Vickers medium tanks, a motorized machine gun battalion, a mechanized artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelled guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery (Birch guns), and a motorized company of field engineers. The unit carried out operations on Salisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Although its performance was recognised, it was disbanded in 1928.

All European states (with the exception of Germany), the USA, and Japan, would create their own experimental mechanised forces during the late 1920s, many using either French of British vehicle designs or even directly purchased vehicles, but largely borrowing from both to develop their own doctrines. Early in the 1930s after the rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, German officers were sent to observe and participate in development of armoured doctrine in the USSR.

In the 1930s the British Army began the conversion of its cavalry from horse to tanks. Although there were differences on where British military strength should be developed, with the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy being favoured by some in power, all but a few regiments were fully converted by 1939.
In the Soviet Union during the early 1930s Red Army and German officers collaborated in developing use of tanks based on 2nd generation vehicles using turreted main weapons, and experimenting with different chassis configurations and drive trains. One important acquisition for the Red Army turned out to be the purchase of a T3 chassis from an inspired US designer J.W.Christie which served as the basis of the Soviet BT series of fast tanks. The Red Army in particular was much influenced by the theoretical works of Marshal Tukhachevsky that led to development of infantry support heavy tanks and fast 'cavalry' tanks for use in the theory of deep operations similar to the German blitzkrieg. This development led to the intent by the Red Army to form a massive tank force of thousands of vehicles.

As Europe neared another conflict, doctrinal development of armoured warfare was still in development, opinion split between proponents of infantry as the primary combat Arm, and those arguing that Infantry was to become the supporting Arm of the more mobile armoured forces. Use of Armoured Warfare was most prominently tested during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars conflict in 1938.

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